News Comments

China Hawks Are Going After Wolf Warriors

Re: Josh Rogin at the Washington Post recently wrote a piece on the Trump administration’s China hawks. The latest episode involves current national security adviser Robert C. O’Brien giving a speech in Arizona widely seen as the harshest anti-CCP statement a senior U.S. official has given in recent memory.

Since the election is only several months away, I think now is a pretty unfortunate time to predict whether these speeches are mere political positioning or preambles to more meaningful, actionable policies.

But I can see the logic behind these moves: “wolf warriors” and those doing CCP propaganda and foreign influence work have dug a massive hole for themselves to jump in without any real backups or plans to come out of the hole—even though their initial intention might be to tilt the balance in their favor by taking advantage of the pandemic.

Unsurprisingly, hawk-eyed China hawks and political executives inside the Beltway saw these shoot-oneself-in-the-foot stumbles as a godsend for them to introduce to the mainstream many of the hardline policy stances they have long yearned for. Regrettably, not all of these stances may lead to policies that align well with the U.S. strategic approach to the PRC or the effects that the approach is trying to achieve (the economic loss and brain drain resulting from restricting visas for Chinese students come to mind).

Having said that, those policies aiming for the development and control of critical future technologies should ALWAYS be given the top priority and deserve rigorous planning and analysis, because I believe this is also the area that the “single authority” and his small group of underlings/advisors are betting on in the long run (so it renders many of the recent IR talks such as the one by Yuan Peng of less importance or relevance).

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News Comments, Reflections

New Wine in Old Bottles

James Traub at Foreign Policy recently wrote an article on America no longer being free. This has prompted some in the China watcher community to wonder whether the U.S., both as a polity and a dominant builder of international order, is losing its attractiveness for others to follow and whether the status quo would help promote China.

Here is my take on these issues, together with some theorizing and a small prediction.

Re: Is the U.S. model no longer attractive? Will the China model become more attractive?

Other than some first-generation Chinese immigrants, very few people in the developed world would find the China model an attractive alternative even if the current ruling values in America completely collapse.

On top of that, the “U.S. model” is continually evolving. If “Western” values à la traditional European Enlightenment no longer support American primacy, I cannot think of why something else will not come out to serve that purpose better.

Just to be clear, that “something else” re America’s future on the world stage can come within the liberal idea. It may well be the case that it addresses the limits and shortcomings associated with traditional European liberalism.

Re: Why do many Chinese people living in the West oppose the idea of having liberal democracy in China, even if they themselves have seen firsthand how democracy works and chosen to stay in it?

There are certain knee-jerk reactions to those growing up in mainland China when it comes to the “motherland” (祖国). Think, for instance, of their often subliminal feelings of inadequacy and low self-esteem associated with “guochi” (国耻, ethnic-national shame in connection with the Middle Country/Qing Dynasty’s downfall when confronted by Western powers in the 19th century), or of their attitude toward separatism in Tibet, Xinjiang, Taiwan, and most recently, Hong Kong.

The CCP has successfully exploited these narratives (e.g., using meticulously designed propaganda and “patriotic education”) to shore up its legitimacy. And together with China’s information decoupling (e.g., WeChat and Weibo accounts catering to overseas Chinese students, most of whom do not read from local sources), the majority of Chinese cannot recognize how subconsciously they are under the influence.

Such ideas as “democracy is too risky” and “the Chinese people are not ready for democracy” are also among those pumped into their heads. As a result, liberal values that are learned even after moving to the West cannot easily override these conditioned responses from their younger selves’ own experience. Many observers have noted that even reasonable Chinese people would suddenly become irrational when certain buttons are pushed.

Re: Various forms of democracy exist—even between the U.S. and the U.K., there are many differences in their respective systems. China should have a democratic system that is different from the rest of the world.

“Democracy,” “freedom,” “equality of rights,” “liberty,” … one can call it whatever they like. But to quote U.S. Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart, “I know it when I see it.”

Sure, for the U.S. (presidential), U.K. (Westminster), France (semi-presidential), or a presumably genuinely democratic system in a future China, each can have vastly different arrangements on the cultural, social normative, and political functional levels. But what I see is that all are founded on the same type of liberal social contract and source of political truth (i.e., clashes of varied ideas, as reflected in votes, protests, and political debates), whose origins can be traced back to the works of Hobbes, Locke, or Rousseau—regardless of whether a theory of “natural rights” is invoked.

In contrast, the “democracy with Chinese characteristics” system under the CCP is a completely different animal, and it is not compatible with the above.

That being said, unless there is some serious structural change on the societal level—something on the scale of a civil war or a revolution—it seems unlikely to me that China would transition to a genuinely democratic system in the foreseeable future.

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News Comments

Zoom; India-China Border Tensions

Re: Zhou Fengsuo, a former student leader in China, held a Zoom event commemorating the 31st anniversary of the June 4 Tiananmen Square Massacre through a paid Zoom account associated with the U.S.-based nonprofit Humanitarian China. On June 7, Zhou’s account was shut down after Chinese authorities contacted Zoom.

This incident is just one more item to be added to the long list of repulsive things associated with Zoom, but I think Zoom is doomed anyway. I have just bought some medium-dated puts against $ZM, and hopefully, Zoom would be dead once people start to realize there are so many better alternatives out there, such as Microsoft Teams.

Re: Indian and Chinese troops have recently been engaged in aggressive posturing in disputed areas in Ladakh, signaling that the confrontation could escalate to one unseen after the Doklam stand-off in 2017.

My hunch is that it has something to do with domestic pressures on the “single authority” (一尊). I believe he is ultimately aiming for Taiwan to divert these pressures, and there appears to be strong support inside the PRC (or what the “single authority” and his small circle of advisors presumably believe to be strong domestic support) for taking over Taiwan by force given the recent rise of “wolf warriors” (战狼) diplomats and an enhanced wave of ethnonationalism in China.

But the “single authority” also needs his army (the real one, not the 50-cent army) to be ready given that the PLA has not been in a major conflict for 40 years. A limited battle against India along the border could be seen as a proper opportunity to show off their military capabilities, sharpen their skills, and enhance their field experience.

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