As I alluded to several times in my previous posts, China has something called “democracy with Chinese characteristics.” On the one hand, for those who grew up in the PRC and went through “patriotic education,” the phrase has always been there, but its meaning has never been apparent. On the other hand, a shadow of a doubt—or should I say, conspiracy—has constantly been cast on the version of democracy that is without Chinese characteristics whenever an average Chinese person wants to learn something about the latter from party-approved sources, which are virtually all they can get if they do not speak another language or use a VPN.

Most recently, this phenomenon has been manifest in the curious effort by the CCP leadership to “redefine” democracy. For instance, and I quote the always-loyal party tabloid the Global Times (环球时报):

Jiang Jinquan, director of the Policy Research Office of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, made the remarks at Friday’s press conference on the sixth plenary session of the 19th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

He said democracy is not a patent of the West, nor can it be defined by the West. Western democracy is a democracy dominated by capital, a democracy of the rich, not true democracy.

…

Color revolutions in recent years have resulted in disasters to local people, which the people of the world have become increasingly aware of, Jiang said in response to a question on comparison between China’s whole-process people’s democracy and Western democracy.

Usually, I am sort of cagey when it comes to domestic politics in the US. Still, as someone who spent his first two decades of life in the PRC and who unavoidably had his perception of the world geared toward the possibility of a “Western conspiracy,” I do have an interest in giving my two cents on the issue of “true democracy.”

The “stupid wokeness,” or “‘defund the police’ lunacy,” as Democratic strategist James Carville calls it, seems to show that “Western democracy” is real and extends beyond the “bourgeoisie.” I tend to view “wokeness” as not being “stupid” or “lunatic,” but as the rise—within the democratic system—of a radical and powerful ideology and political movement, as well as a way of “brainwashing” the next generation, that is arguably revolutionary/destructive to the very foundation and upkeep of the prevailing social contract in the world’s most successful capitalist society.

As reflected in the latest election results, the current backlash against “wokeness” and “critical race theory” appears to be part of the re-adjustment process and negative feedback loop that is also a typical feature of “Western democracy.” But can those in the PRC say in any meaningful way that their “whole-process democracy” has the same level of openness and tolerance toward endogenous changes in political and social institutions (regardless of the direction of change) and even the “overthrow” thereof?

All in all, despite my pre-existing bias, “Western democracy” feels very true to me. To what extent it “works” is a topic for another day.

The recent crackdown by Chinese authorities on their largely foreign-listed education and tech companies has caused much chaos among Western investors.

As I hinted last year, the CCP leadership’s vision for China’s future appears to be a sophisticated version of high-tech big-data authoritarianism that advances the interest of the party-state. While “authoritarianism” and “big data” are the inherent political and demographic characteristics of China, “high tech” is, to a great extent, an imported good. Given that foreign investment and know-how in technology are still relatively scarce, it is indeed puzzling to see the PRC killing the goose that lays the golden eggs at such an early stage of its “technology struggle,” to the point where it appeared to be helping its adversaries in achieving their goals.

Unless “we must have missed something”—as the “conventional wisdom” goes when it comes to the “mysterious ancient nation that reads Sun Tzu and plays Go”—

Unsurprisingly, the “usual suspects” in the U.S. quickly came to the PRC’s rescue, arguing that “investors have misconstrued China” and it “could ultimately be a good thing.”

So is China playing Go? I don’t know. What I do know is that an enormous bet is being placed: if successful, it could make George Orwell blush for his lack of imagination, but if it goes south, one can only hope that things would end up peacefully.

By a vote of 2,895 to 0 (with one abstention), China’s rubber-stamp legislature near-unanimously approved sweeping changes to Hong Kong’s electoral process, ensuring that candidates will be “patriots only” per Beijing’s requirement. Concurrently, 47 politicians and activists in Hong Kong were charged with “subversion,” kept in custody pending trial. The message that the PRC is sending to Taiwan could not be clearer: Do not expect your political system to be honored and/or allowed to co-exist should any deal be struck between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.

On a related note, Admiral Philip S. Davidson, head of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, recently said that China might be capable of forcing a “reunification” with Taiwan within the next six years, as part of Beijing’s ambition to supplant the U.S. in geopolitical matters in the Western Pacific area. Indeed, “rise of the East, decline of the West” (东升西降) has become a familiar refrain for Chinese officials and state-controlled media outlets as they declared “victory” over COVID-19 and mocked the chaotic responses in the West—in particular, the U.S.—apparently with some “China experts” going along the same line, as I have documented here.

However, Admiral Davidson did not mention that the PLA, while seemingly impressive on the outside, is largely untried in real battles. This, together with the clandestine nature of the PRC’s political and military systems, makes it even harder for both the decision-makers within the PLA and the outside world to evaluate its strengths and conditions (same for other complex issues such as China’s economic growth or its handling of COVID-19 beyond the party line/propaganda). While I predicted last year that the India-China border tension would escalate to one of explicit armed conflict and casualties—which unfortunately turned out to be true just a few days after I posted my thoughts—the melee that actually ensued revealed little information about what would happen should armed clashes break out between the PLA and the Taiwanese armed forces.

China’s obsession with “sovereignty and territorial integrity” (主权和领土完整) has always been part of the core of its authoritarian ethnonationalism (the other part appears to be the “Chinese/Han race”), as is reflected in its “patriotic education” to the point where certain words and phrases such as “separatism” (分裂/分离主义) and “Taiwan independence” (台独) can stimulate strong emotions of contempt and hatred in an average school child. This, in turn, has prevented the average Chinese from ever thinking about these issues because the fear of themselves being associated with a (real or imagined) “separatist” or “Taiwan independence advocate” is so strong that they risk being crushed by the society they live in.

Absent credible external deterrence, taking bold action on Taiwan might just be a good way for the CCP leadership to galvanize nationalist support and deflect attention from increasingly thorny domestic challenges.