The Financial Times reported that China’s State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) recently published draft rules to prevent “monopoly behavior” on Internet platforms such as Alibaba, Tencent, and Meituan.

Some observers are quick to point out that this move may be connected to China’s recent crackdown on Ant Group, teaching everyone, including Jack Ma, the wealthiest person in China and founder of both Alibaba and Ant, a lesson about who is in charge.

Others argue that such a move is imperative in its own right. These massive tech companies have repeatedly been caught engaging in various anti-competitive practices in recent years. Therefore, they say, the SAMR is merely making things better for the consumers and small businesses that rely on these platforms.

China’s approach toward anti-competitive behavior is an interesting case study. The PRC adopted the Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) in 2007 and has, for more than a decade, been refining its competition rules to catch up with Western developed economies, especially the United States. With the newly published rules, they have even leapfrogged to complex competition issues related to multisided platforms and business models that are built on network effects, the very same constructs with which the FTC and the DOJ are currently dealing.

That said, the objectives of the AML may still differ, sometimes substantially, from the established antitrust principles in the West. For instance, in addition to “safeguarding consumers’ interests” and “protecting fair market competition,” Article 1 of the AML has a “safeguarding the public interest” provision that may well include national/state security issues—issues that are increasingly pertinent given the series of events since the U.S.-China trade and tech war began to pick up momentum in 2018.

Now, consider the second narrative re China’s anti-monopoly rules against tech giants. The same can be said about state-owned enterprises (SOEs), if not in a more severe sense. Yet, China’s anti-monopoly enforcement rarely, if ever, touches them. If consumer welfare and business competition really are the top priorities for the CCP leadership, wouldn’t it make more sense to target SOEs first? Unsurprisingly, Article 7 of the AML explicitly exempts certain conduct of SOEs (e.g., the “exclusiveness in operation and sales”) from being scrutinized in the context of promoting market competition.

Re: Reuters reported that China’s foreign minister Wang Yi recently softened his tone on the U.S.-China relations. In his speech, Wang appeared to be “seeking common ground while reserving differences.” Wang claimed that the two countries should not attempt to change each other, as “China cannot and will not become another America,” adding that a socialist system is suited to China and “its people’s choice.”

Wang Yi’s speech made a reference to the political system. His claim that “China will not and cannot become another America” clearly intends to appeal to those on the left, many of whom have long held that U.S. foreign policies are based on illiberal hegemony and an “imperialist mentality.”

However, in this case, it is delusional to take Wang’s word seriously. Politically, China has mostly been left alone in its own way in the past 30 years. It is still in its top-down authoritarian form that lacks the legitimacy to rule, unlike one provided by an electoral mechanism. On the other hand, forcing a change has not been a prerequisite for the West to engage with China during the same period.

So why a sudden rush of “imperialist impetus” from the U.S. now? Some may argue that this is because of President Trump, but just turning around and taking a quick look at all other countries in the Five Eyes as well as at China’s neighbors proves that such an argument is flawed.

The West is standing up to China because it is crucial for the West’s own self-preservation. The left needs to be reminded that whatever rights they enjoy and whatever activism they preach and practice are, first and foremost, founded on the very fact that they live in a society with civil liberties. And those civil liberties are not to be taken for granted—this is something they are fully aware of when it comes to President Trump but conveniently ignored elsewhere.

Re: Josh Rogin at the Washington Post recently wrote a piece on the Trump administration’s China hawks. The latest episode involves current national security adviser Robert C. O’Brien giving a speech in Arizona widely seen as the harshest anti-CCP statement a senior U.S. official has given in recent memory.

Since the election is only several months away, I think now is a pretty unfortunate time to predict whether these speeches are mere political positioning or preambles to more meaningful, actionable policies.

But I can see the logic behind these moves: “wolf warriors” and those doing CCP propaganda and foreign influence work have dug a massive hole for themselves to jump in without any real backups or plans to come out of the hole—even though their initial intention might be to tilt the balance in their favor by taking advantage of the pandemic.

Unsurprisingly, hawk-eyed China hawks and political executives inside the Beltway saw these shoot-oneself-in-the-foot stumbles as a godsend for them to introduce to the mainstream many of the hardline policy stances they have long yearned for. Regrettably, not all of these stances may lead to policies that align well with the U.S. strategic approach to the PRC or the effects that the approach is trying to achieve (the economic loss and brain drain resulting from restricting visas for Chinese students come to mind).

Having said that, those policies aiming for the development and control of critical future technologies should ALWAYS be given the top priority and deserve rigorous planning and analysis, because I believe this is also the area that the “single authority” and his small group of underlings/advisors are betting on in the long run (so it renders many of the recent IR talks such as the one by Yuan Peng of less importance or relevance).